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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Modification of Child Custody Awards-Jurisdictional Requirements. In 1946, the Washington Supreme Court took the position that
the courts of this state would not consider modifying custody awards
of sister states granted in divorce proceedings until such time as the
children became domiciliaries of the State of Washington.' In the recent case of Guy v. Guy,2 the court appears to have silently backed
away from this narrow ground, and seemingly in the proper circumstances will accept physical presence of the children as an adequate
basis of jurisdiction.
In the Guy case, the Washington court was asked to review the trial
court's refusal to hear the merits of the mother's cross-petition for
modification of an Indiana custody award to the father. Mr. and Mrs.
Guy and their son were residents and domiciliaries of the State of
Indiana in November of 1957 when Guy started divorce proceedings
in the superior court of Marion County of that state. In June of 1958,
before a decree had been granted, Mrs. Guy moved to Washington
taking the child with her. At that time Mr. Guy had not made an
appearance in the divorce proceedings and had filed no pleadings or
cross-complaints. Later, a cross-complaint was filed by Mr. Guy, and
the Indiana court, in a hearing at which Mrs. Guy did not appear,
entered a decree awarding Mr. Guy a final divorce and complete
custody of the child.
Mr. Guy, armed with his Indiana custody award, petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus in the superior court of King County, seeking
to obtain possession of the child. Mrs. Guy cross-petitioned for a
modification of the Indiana decree, alleging that there had been a
change of conditions with respect to her circumstances and those of
her ex-husband, and that in order to benefit the child the Indiana
decree should be modified. The trial court sustained Mr. Guy's demurrer to the cross-petition, heard testimony concerning the validity
publicly known and allegations publicly heard, as a form of reference from which the
grand jury should begin its investigation." 155 Wash. Dec. at 572, 349 P.2d at 391.
"Where the prosecutor is properly in attendance during the examination of witnesses, [in grand jury proceedings] we find a significant lack of precedents concerning
judicial review or control of his conduct of such examinations. The conclusion must be
that the examination of witnesses before a grand jury has never been intended to be
a matter of judicial control as in the examination of witnesses before a petit jury."
155 Wash. Dec. at 574, 349 P.2d at 392.
Does the cumulative effect of state action in the Beck case violate the dictates of
reason ?
1 In re Mullins, 26 Wn.2d 419, 174 P2d 790 (1946).
2 55 Wn.2d 571, 348 P.2d 657 (1960).
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of the Indiana decree, and concluded that the decree of the Indiana
court should be given full faith and credit: that Mr. Guy was entitled
to immediate and absolute custody of the child. The effective date of
the order was delayed in order to give Mrs. Guy opportunity to have
the action reviewed by writ of certiorari.
On review, the Washington Supreme Court resolved the question
before it by application of the full faith and credit clause, as interpreted in People ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey.' The Washington court
held that the Halvey case was controlling in the disposition of the
review, and as the Indiana court had jurisdiction to modify its own
decree, and could do so upon a showing of a change of conditions and
circumstances of the parties occurring after entry of the original
award,' the Washington court also could modify the decree. The court
further observed:
The King County superior court had the child and both parents before it
as did the New York court in the Halvey case. The facts are clear, as
admitted by the petitioner's demurrer to the relator's cross-petition, that
there has been a change in condition and circumstances since the entry
of the decree on March 3, 1959. Under the full faith and credit clause,
Art. IV, § 1, of the United States Constitution, as construed in the
Halvey case, supra, the Washington court had at least the same right to
modify this decree as did the Indiana court.
The case was sent back to the trial court for a hearing on the merits
of the wife's petition for a modification of the Indiana custody award.
The significant portion of the court's opinion in the Guy case is
quoted above, that is, the court's contention that the trial court had
jurisdiction to hear the petition for modification because it had the
parents and the child physically present before it, as did the New York
court in the Halvey case. In the Halvey case the parents were residents
of New York until the mother took the child to Florida, established
residence there, and subsequently filed for divorce in that state.
Service on the father was by publication. On the day before the entry
of the Florida decree, which awarded custody to the mother, the father
removed the child to New York. The wife then brought habeas corpus
proceedings in New York. The husband defended by contending that
8 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
4The Washington position is that the jurisdiction of a divorce court is continuing
as to the custody of children and support allowances. Lanctot v. Lanctot, 125 Wash.
310, 216 Pac. 356 (1923). The Indiana position is the same. Scott v. Kell, 127 Ind.
App. 472, 134 N.E.2d 828 (1956) ; McDonald v. Short, 190 Ind. 338, 130 N.E. 536
(1921) ; Stone v. Stone, 158 Ind. 628, 64 N.E. 86 (1902).
5 Guy v. Guy, 55 Wn.2d 571, 575, 348 P2d 657, 660 (1960).
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the Florida court lacked jurisdiction to make a custody award. The
New York court decided that in view of the liberality of affording a
mother equal rights with the father concerning the children, and that
because the mother and child were domiciliaries of the State of Florida,
the Florida decree was entitled to full faith and credit. The New York
court, however, feeling that the father was entitled to certain rights,
modified the Florida decree and awarded visitation rights to the
father,6 evidently basing its jurisdiction on the physical presence of
the parties and the child in New York State. On certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, notifng that the New York court had the parties
before it, held that since Florida could modify the decree, so could the
New York court.'
That the Washington court has the power to make modifications of
the custody awards of sister states, when those awards can be modified
in the awarding state, there is little doubt. As the United States Supreme Court's opinion in the Halvey case indicates, as far as full faith
and credit is concerned, when one state can modify its own decree,
that judgment is not constitutionally entitled to a more conclusive or
final effect in the state of the forum than it has in the state where
rendered.
Although a state may have power to modify the custody decree of a
sister state, most states have seen fit to limit that power by selfimposed restrictions, or more precisely, have specified some relationship between the parties and the state which will give a jurisdictional
basis for making such modifications.
There appear to be at least three theories as to the correct basis for
courts to assume jurisdiction over custody proceedings when modifying an existing custody decree. A few states feel that jurisdiction to
grant a custody decree is dependent upon jurisdiction over the child's
parents.8 Other states take the approach that custody is a question of
6 Opinion in Ex Parte Halvey, 185 Misc. 52, 55 N.Y.S.2d 761 (Sup. Ct. 1945),
aff'd, 269 App. Div. 1019, 59 N.Y.S.2d 396 (1945), aff'd. 295 N.Y. 836, 66 N.E.2d 851
(1946), aft'd, 330 U.S. 610 (1947).
7 The majority in the Halvey case, based their decision on the conclusion that if
Florida could modify its own decree, the New York court could also modify it. The
court did not consider the question of whether the Florida court had jurisdiction to
make a custody award concerning the Halvey child. (Under Florida law, the child
must he physically present and domiciled in the state, and the domicile of the father is
the domicile of the child. Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So. 2d 734 (1941).
Moreover, the father, not domiciled in Florida, had removed the child from the state
before the entry of the final decree.) Also, the court did not consider whether the
ex parte Florida decree was binding on the father. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S.
528 (1953).
8 Anderson v. Anderson, 74 WVa. 124, 81 S.E. 706 (1914). In Jennings v. Jennings,
251 Ala. 73, 36 So. 2d 236 (1948), the court held unconstitutional a statute enabling
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status, and as such is subject to the control of the state where the
child is domiciled.' The third theory requires that the child be physically present within the state, on the grounds that the basic problem
before the court is to determine what is in the best interest of the child,
and the court most qualified to do so is the one having access to the
child.' 0
Washington case law prior to 1946 was somewhat inconsistent as to
the factors needed before the Washington courts would have jurisdiction to modify a sister state's custody award. Although no attempt will
be made to give a complete summary of the Washington law on this
point, reference to a few of the more important cases is appropos.
In McClain v. McClain," the father brought the child to Washington in violation of a Texas custody decree. The mother upon locating
the father and child brought habeas corpus proceedings. The Washington Supreme Court in its first hearing on the matter concluded that
the Texas decree should be modified, and custody of the child should
remain with the father. On rehearing, the court reversed its position,
upheld the Texas decree, and returned the child to its mother. The
court stated that if it had been of the opinion that it was in the best
interests of the child that it remain with the father, it would have so
ordered. No mention was made of any requirement that the child be a
domiciliary of the state in order for the Washington court to modify
the Texas decree.
In Motichka v. Rollands,'the father, who had been awarded custoday of the child by a Montana divorce decree, permitted it to visit
the mother, then residing in Washington. At the appointed time, the
mother refused to return the child, and the father brought habeas
corpus proceedings. The mother defended by contending that the
Washington court had jurisdiction of the child and that it could determine a modification of the Montana custody award. The trial court
upheld the mother's contention, and awarded custody to the mother.
The Washington Supreme Court in reversing said that the Montana
decree must be given full faith and credit and must be recognized as
final in the Washington courts until such time as the child ceased to be
the courts of Alabama to grant divorces with only personal jurisdiction over the
parties.
9
Dorman v. Friendly, 146 Fla. 732, 1 So. 2d 734 (1941); Goodrich, Custody of
Children in Divorce Suits, 7 Cornell L.Q. 1 (1921).
10 Sheehy v. Sheehy, 88 N.H. 223, 186 Atl. 1 (1936).
11115 Wash. 237, 197 Pac. 5, rev'd on rehearing, 115 Wash. 237, 202 Pac. 173
(1921).
12 144 Wash. 565, 258 Pac. 333 (1927).

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 36

domiciled in the State of Montana, and that a state may not assume
general guardianship over a minor temporarily sojourning in that state
who has a residence or domicile elsewhere.
In In re Penner,13 the custody of the children was awarded to the
father in a Montana divorce decree. The mother, dissatisfied with the
award, petitioned for modification, and in violation of a court order
removed the children to Washington and secreted them from the father
for a period of three years. The father upon finding the children
brought habeas corpus proceedings. The trial court heard testimony
by both parties, and dismissed the husband's petition. The husband
appealed contending that the trial court erred in hearing testimony on
the merits and in refusing to recognize the Montana decree as controlling. The Washington Supreme Court ruled that the trial court was
justified in hearing the question of custody on the merits (evidently
the question was put in issue by the wife's answer to the husband's
petition), since in such cases the welfare of the children was the chief
consideration, but that the court should have upheld the Montana
custody decree as the mother had failed to show sufficient reasons to
support a modification. The court did not pass upon the question of
domicile as a basis for the trial court's jurisdiction to hear the controversy on the merits.
In Jones v. McCloud, 4 an Oregon divorce decree granted custody of
the child to the father, the mother to have possession of the child during the summer months. The mother took the child to Washington
and refused to return him to the father, who thereupon brought an
action to recover custody. The trial court awarded custody to the
mother. The Washington Supreme Court, in reversing, stated that it
was of the opinion that there had been no such change in the condition
of the parties as to warrant the modification of the Oregon decree; and
as the mother had obtained only temporary possession of the child,
with no permission to remove it from the state of Oregon, the child
never became a resident or domiciliary of Washington.
In 1946, the court in In re Mullins15 refused to hear the merits of
the wife's petition for modification of an Ohio divorce decree, on the
grounds that although the child had been brought into Washington
legally, it had been detained here in violation of a valid Ohio custody
decree, and that under the concepts of fair play and justice, one acting
13

161 Wash. 479, 297 Pac. 757 (1931).

14 19 Wn.2d 314, 142 P.2d 397 (1943).

15 26 Wn.2d 419, 174 P.2d 790 (1946).
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in disobedience to an order of court cannot secure a new domicile for
his children. The court recognized that there was no single rule that
would reconcile all of the prior Washington case law on the subject,
and stated that the decrees of a court of a sister state must be given
full faith and credit in cases in which the court of the sister state had
jurisdiction, and that Washington courts would not consider changing
the custody of children whose custody had been determined by such a
decree until the children became domiciled in this state. The case has
since been cited as authority for this proposition. 6
Subsequent to the Mullins decision, then, the law of Washington
was apparently clear: Washington courts would not consider the question of the modification of a valid custody decree entered by a sister
state unless the child in question was a domiciliary of this state and
there was a real and substantial change in circumstances of the parties
since the entry of the original decree. It would seem, then, that the
initial question for the court to have decided in the Guy case was
whether the child was a domiciliary of the State of Washington."
The court could have found that the Guy child was a domiciliary of
the State of Washington, since under Washington law a mother has
equal rights with the father in regards to children," and questions of
domicile are decided by the law of the forum." Mrs. Guy's position
was distinguishable from that of the parents seeking custody modifications in the cases discussed above, as she was not acting in violation of
a sister state's custody decree by bringing the child into this state and
keeping it here (at least for the period of time prior to the entry of the
Indiana decree). The question of the child's domicile is of course not
without complications. Since Mrs. Guy had initiated the Indiana divorce proceedings, she could not avoid the jurisdiction of the Indiana
courts by removing the child from that state;" as a result she was
bound by the Indiana decree. Mrs. Guy was faced with the obstacle
of convincing the Washington court that her secretive removal of the
child from the State of Indiana in the face of a pending Indiana divorce
proceedings, and her wrongful detention of the child in Washington
after the entry of the custody award to the father, did not violate the
concepts of fair play and justice that motivated the court in the Mullins
16 Sherwood v. Sherwood 48 Wn.2d 128, 291 P.2d 674 (1955).
Both the petitioner and respondent, relying on the Mullins case, argued the question of domicile.
17

18 RCW 26.16.125.
19
GooDRICH, CONFLICTS OF LAW, 21 (3d ed. 1949).
20

Maloney v. Maloney. 67 Cal. App. 2d 278, 154 P.2d 426 (1944) ; State v. Rhoades,
29 Wash. 61, 69 Pac. 389 (1902).
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case to decide that the mother could not establish a new domicile for
her child.
The court avoided the problems of resolving the child's domicile by
deciding that the trial court had the jurisdictional basis to modify the
Indiana custody decree on the same grounds that the New York court
did in the Halvey case, i.e., that the parties and child were physically
present in the state and before the court.
As the brief summary of the Washington law above indicates, a finding that the court, acting in the best interest of the child, has a jurisdictional basis for considering the modification of a sister state's
custody award when the court has the parties and the child present in
the state, is not without precedent in Washington law. Considering the
United States Supreme Court's decision in the Halvey case, physical
presence of the parties in the state is sufficient contact between the
parties and the state to assure that the reviewing court will not be
acting in violation of constitutional provisions. But although the court
may be on firm grounds constitutionally, a finding that the child was
a domiciliary of Washington would be necessary to make its decision
in the Guy case consistent with its apparently controlling decision in
the Mullins case.
The result in the Guy case may be indicative of the Washington
court's adoption of a more flexible position in the matter: when the
parent has brought the child into this state in good faith, the court
will entertain a petition for modification of the foreign custody decree,
but when the parent brings the child here in violation of a valid custody
award, the court will, relying on the Mullins case, refuse to hear the
parent's petition for modification. 2
It is possible that a Washington court's modification of a custody
award, in order to serve the best interests of the child who is physically
present in this state, will have the effect of settling the matter between
the parties. Where this result can be achieved, with the accompanying
reduction in traveling and legal expenses to the parties, it seems desirable that each case should be heard on its own merits to determine
if there has been a material change in the circumstances of the parties.
DALE KREMER
21 In Chandler v. Chandler, 156 Wash. Dec. 414, 353 P.2d 417 (1960), decided after
the Guy case, the court refused to hear the father's petition for modification of an
Arkansas custody award to the mother, where the father had removed the children to
Washington in violation of that decree. The court referred to the Mullins case for its
authority.

